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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt
auctions within a period is suﬃciently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of
real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical
to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.
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for many useful comments. The views expressed herein are the those of the author and not necessarily those
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Several observers have argued that short-term debt played an important role in the
recent ﬁnancial crises in Mexico and East Asia or, more generally, that short-term debt allows
the possibility of bad equilibrium outcomes which would not exist under longer maturity
structures. In particular, Cole and Kehoe (2000), Calvo (1988), and Alesina, Prati, and
Tabellini (1990) argue that, in a world without commitment, governments can face ﬁnancial
crises as an equilibrium outcome if they issue too much short-term debt and that these crises
cannot occur if they do not issue short-term debt. The natural policy prescription for such a
situation is that governments should simply avoid issuing short-term debt.
Here, I question the theoretical basis of these arguments against short-term debt.
In the above papers, the inability of a government to commit is crucial since it is relatively
straightforward to show that under an assumption of full commitment by governments toward
future policy, any allocation which can be achieved by a complicated portfolio of government
bonds can be achieved by a government which issues only short-term contingent debt. This
paper presents a result which parallels the known result under full commitment, but this time
for a world without commitment: Any allocation which can be achieved by a complicated
portfolio of government bonds can be achieved by a government which issues only short-term
contingent debt.
Formally, I get this equivalence result by considering the set of equilibria of two games.
In the ﬁrst, a government can make payments to households conditional on their holdings
of government-issued paper printed in the preceding period. In the second, the government
can make payments to households conditional on their holdings of government-issued paper
printed at all previous dates. I ﬁnd that in terms of real outcomes, the set of equilibria forthe two games is identical.
There are two key diﬀerences between my work and others’ in this area (such as Cole
and Kehoe [2000]). First, I assume a general timing structure for debt auctions and debt
repayments. This allows one to design the timing of debt auctions and debt repayments in
each environment to mimic the incentives a government faces when in the other. Second, I
assume that default is a purely expectational phenomenon. That is, if a government defaults
on its debt, while lenders may update their beliefs regarding future repayments, the physical
world does not change.
I present the equivalence result as two theorems: (1) Any real outcome of a game with
only one-period debt can be achieved as an equilibrium of a game with many-period debt,
and (2) vice versa: any real outcome of a game with many-period debt can be achieved as an
equilibrium of a game where only one-period debt is available.
The logic of the ﬁrst result is simple and robust: To replicate an equilibrium (good or
bad) from a world with only one-period debt in a world where many-period debt is available,
one simply gives lenders an expectation that longer-period debt will not be repaid. Given
this expectation, a government has no incentive to deviate and issue long-term debt.
The second result is more diﬃcult. When short-term debt is used to replicate the net
ﬂows and household incentives of a debt scheme involving long-term debt, large debt rollovers
may be required. This can aﬀect the incentives of the government regarding default. If these
large debt rollovers are required to be done in one step, then the size of the required debt
auction may be too large for the government to resist the temptation to default. However, if
the timing structure is generalized to allow a ﬁnite length sequence of smaller debt auctions,
then the government can be made to never have more real resources on hand than it does
2under the long-term debt equilibrium. This allows the replication of any long-term debt
equilibrium as an equilibrium in a world with only short-term debt. These two results then
allow a simple characterization, independent of the term structure of debt, of when a debt
scheme can be implemented as an equilibrium.
2. The Economy
Consider a world similar to those in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe
(1993), where an inﬁnitely lived government faces a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households
with unit mass. In each period t =1 ,...,∞, households care about their own leisure, their
private consumption of the single consumption good, and the level of government consump-
tion. A household’s per-period utility over certain outcomes is given by
u(ct) − w( t)+v(Gt,α t),
where ct and  t represent private consumption and labor, Gt represents the common level
of government services, and αt represents a common shock to preferences for government
services. The shock αt is assumed to be observable, take on a ﬁnite number of values,
and follow a one-stage Markov process represented by π(α |α) with α1 given. Assume that
u : R+ → R is increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable and unbounded below. Labor
  is assumed to be bounded above by unity and below by zero with lim →1 w( )=−∞
and lim →0 w ( ) = 0. Finally, assume limG→0 v(G,α)=−∞ for all α. Over a lifetime,
households care about the expected discounted value of the stream of per-period utilities
with the discount parameter denoted by β<1.
3The government is assumed to be benevolent. It discounts the future at the same rate
as households and its per-period utility is given by
u(Ct) − w(Lt)+v(Gt,α t),
where Ct and Lt represent the mean levels of consumption and labor. The assumption of
benevolence is purely for notational convenience. All results go through for other utility
functions for the government.
Output is assumed to be linear in labor—one unit of labor produces one unit of the
consumption good, which can be used for either private or government consumption in the
period it was produced. No storage (productive or otherwise) is available.
The government is assumed to be able to make lump-sum transfers to households, but
cannot lump sum tax. To fund government consumption or lump-sum transfers, the govern-
ment can linearly tax labor (up to an upper bound τ<1) or “borrow” from households. More
speciﬁcally, the government has the ability to print pieces of paper (bonds) distinguishable
by the date they were printed. (The issue date is written on the bond). The government can
(in a manner to be made more explicit later) auction this paper to households for the con-
sumption good and can make nonnegative transfers of the consumption good to households
proportional to their holdings of paper printed at previous dates. The government can, of
course, write anything else on this paper that it wishes to (such as at what dates and under
what circumstances it “promises” to make a transfer of the consumption good conditional on
household holdings of the paper), but since the government cannot commit to future actions,
such writing is irrelevant. In the next sections, two speciﬁc game structures are considered
4regarding the auctioning and repayment of this debt.
3. One-Period Debt
First, consider a simple game where the government is restricted to issue only one-
period debt. Formally, paper is assumed to last from the beginning of period t until the end of
period t+1, when it dissolves. (At any point in time there are only two distinguishable types
of paper: that printed last period and that printed this period). Time is divided into periods
t =1 ,...,∞, and the periods themselves are divided into subperiods i =1 ,...,I. These
subperiods correspond to the timing of auctions and repayments, and not to production or
consumption, and thus can be considered as taking arbitrarily little real time.
At the beginning of each period t, households hold nonnegative amounts of government
paper printed in period t − 1. The aggregate amount of this is assumed, without loss, to be
unity. (In period t = 1, each household owns a unit of paper dated t = 0.) In each period,
the government moves ﬁrst by announcing a tax rate on labor, with households subsequently
choosing labor  t ≥ 0 with an average value of Lt.1 The collection of labor tax revenue is
assumed to occur simultaneously with production. Thus, at this point, the government has
τtLt units of the consumption good, and a household which chose  t has (1 − τt) t units of
the consumption good.
Next the government auctions fraction qt,1 of period t paper to households. This results
in a transfer from households to the government of qt,1Pt,1 units of the consumption good,
where Pt,1 denotes the price of a unit of period t paper at the ﬁrst auction (i = 1). The
government then chooses a lump-sum payment to households Xt,1 ≥ 0 and a payment to
1The timing ensures that labor taxes are distortionary. Given that preferences for government spending
change over time, this introduces a motive to use debt in order to smooth labor taxes.
5holders of period t − 1 paper (per unit of paper) Rt,1 ≥ 0. To rule out Ponzi type schemes,
there exists some large number R such that Rt,1 ≤ R for all t. This cycle of auctioning oﬀ
new paper and the government making lump-sum payments and payments to holders of old
paper is then repeated I − 1 times.
Given this structure, government consumption is










and household consumption is










After consumption occurs, the shock to preferences for the next period αt+1 is realized along
with a publicly observed realization of a sunspot variable γt+1 with a uniform [0,1] distribu-
tion. The payoﬀ to the government this period is then u(Ct) − w(Lt)+v(Gt,α t).
I will consider only symmetric equilibria where all households take the same actions
along the equilibrium path. Let an exogenous history θt =( αt,γt) with θ
t = {θ1,...,θ t}. Let
a complete history (including government actions) be denoted ht = {τt,{Xt,i,R t,i}I
i=1,θ t+1}
with ht = {h0,...,h t}. A strategy for this game is a speciﬁcation of prices Pt,i, government
actions (τt,X t,i,R t,i), and household actions Lt (consumption is residual), each as functions of
the observed history of exogenous shocks θ
t and government actions. A symmetric sequential
equilibrium (or SSE) is such a speciﬁcation of these history-dependent prices, household,
and government actions such that i) after all histories ht, no household can improve its
6lifetime payoﬀ by deviating when taking prices, the actions of the other households and the
government as speciﬁed, and ii) after all histories ht, the government cannot improve its
lifetime payoﬀ taking prices and the actions of households as speciﬁed.
Several characteristics of an SSE can be immediately deduced. First, households are
optimizing only if along the path of play
Pt,i = Pt,j (1)
(so Pt ≡ Pt,i). Second, it is necessary that for all histories (on and oﬀ the path of play), the
household’s marginal condition on savings is satisﬁed, or,
u





Finally, it is necessary that the household’s marginal condition on labor versus consumption
is satisﬁed for all histories, or,
u
 (Ct)(1 − τt)=w
 (Lt). (3)
One can immediately characterize the worst equilibrium of this game from the per-
spective of the government. Suppose Rt,i = 0 and Pt,i = 0 at every history of the game
(including past deviations by the government), qt,1 = 1, and Xt,i = 0 for all i ∈{ 1,...,I}.
Given this, all links between periods are severed and one can deliver values for τt and Lt by
7solving the static game given αt. Path play of this static game is the solution to
max
τ,L u((1 − τ)L) − w(L)+v(τL,αt) (4)
subject to L solving
u
 ((1 − τ)L)(1 − τ)=w
 (L). (5)








Lemma 1. A balanced budget rule (Rt,i =0 ,Pt,i = 0 and Xt,i =0 ,i ∈{ 1,...,I}, at every
history of the game, including past deviations by the government, with (τt, Lt) solving (5)
given αt) is an equilibrium. Further, all other equilibria are weakly better (for the government)
after all histories.
Proof. If Rt,i = 0 for all histories, household optimization implies Pt,i = 0. Further, if all
households hold an equal share of the government debt, Rt,i acts exactly as the lump sum
rebate. Since labor taxes are distortionary, standard arguments imply setting Rt,i =0i s
optimal.
Next, suppose there exists an equilibrium with a lifetime payoﬀ to the government
worse than V (αt). Given the concavity assumptions, L(α) is the unique best response to
τ(α) (where (L,τ)(α) is deﬁned by (4)). Thus, the government can unilaterally achieve
V (αt), and thus if it deviates to the balanced budget rule, it receives a higher continuation
payoﬀ.





s(u(Ct+s) − w(Lt+s)+v(Gt+s,α t))] ≥ V (αt). (6)
The condition on government optimization regarding debt payments is as follows. Let Yt,i be
the amount of resources the government has on hand after the ith auction (but before the




j=1(Xt,j + Rt,j). The government is optimizing





s(u(Ct+s) − w(Lt+s)+v(Gt+s,α t))] (7)




That is, the government can receive the path payoﬀ (the left hand side of (7)) or can default,
set government spending weakly less than Yt,i, and then receive the payoﬀ associated with
the balanced budget equilibrium.
The next lemma is useful for establishing bounds on prices.
Lemma 2. There exist C > 0 and G > 0 such that in all equilibria, Ct ≥ C and Gt ≥ G for
all t and all histories.






u((1 − τ)L) − w(L)
 
for the parts of its utility that it can aﬀect. (It cannot aﬀect government). That u is
9unbounded below then delivers C. Likewise, the government can unilaterally achieve V (α).
That v is unbounded below then delivers G.
That consumption is bounded below by C > 0 implies that the marginal utility of
consumption is bounded above by u (C). The marginal utility of consumption in any equi-
librium is bounded below by u (1). Since the most owning an equal share of the paper in
the economy could deliver is a payment of R at all future dates, the price of a unit of paper






Consider now a more general (and thus complicated) game. At the beginning of
each period t ≥ 1, households hold nonnegative amounts of government paper printed in
all previous periods. Paper is distinguishable only by the period t in which is was printed.
The aggregate amount of paper printed in each period is assumed to be unity without loss
of generality. (At t = 1, households are again assumed to each hold a unit of paper dated
t = 0.) The government moves ﬁrst by announcing the tax rate on labor τt, and subsequently,
households choose labor (and thus production)  t ≥ 0 with an average value of Lt. As before,
the collection of labor tax revenue is assumed to occur simultaneously with production.
Next, assume a market for the retrading of old paper with P s
t denoting the price at t of
paper printed in period s. In any symmetric equilibrium, there is no trade in these markets,
but the period t price of paper printed in period s is established.
Once production and retrading have occurred, the government next auctions fraction
qt,1 of period t paper to households at price P t
t,1. As before, the government next chooses




10holders of paper printed in previous periods. Here Rs
t,1 is the amount paid, per unit of paper,
to a holder of period s paper. For convenience, it is assumed that these payments are paid
conditional on a household’s holdings at the beginning of period t before retrading occurs.
This cycle of auctioning oﬀ new paper and the government making lump-sum payments and
payments to holders of old paper is then repeated J − 1 times.
Given this structure, government consumption is
















and average (or symmetric) private consumption is
















After consumption occurs, the shock to preferences for the next period αt+1 is realized along
with a publicly observed realization of a sunspot variable γt+1 with a uniform [0,1] distribu-
tion. The payoﬀ to the government this period is then u(Ct) − w(Lt)+v(Gt,α t).
This game has a deﬁnition of an equilibrium equivalent to that in the previous game
and the same worst equilibrium. Now for each piece of paper, old and new, households must













The optimality conditions for government when setting taxes and making payments (equa-
tions (6) and (7)) are identical, except that amount of revenues the government has on hand
11after auction i, denoted Yt,i is now














The main diﬀerence between the two games is that with paper that last forever (as
opposed to one period) it is possible to have, as an equilibrium, what looks like long term
debt. For instance, a 30-period zero coupon bond would be an equilibrium expectation at
date t − 30 that the government would make a payment at date t of some amount R
t−30
t .
Such an expectation is impossible in the game where paper dissolves after one period.
5. Multiple Equilibria
It should be noted that both the one-period and many-period debt models allow for a
continuum of equilibria. For instance, in both games, any speciﬁcation of on-path consump-
tion, labor, prices, and payments which satisﬁes the household ﬁrst order conditions (with
consumption between C and unity) can be supported as an equilibrium if conditions (6) and
(7) hold by specifying reversion to the balanced budget equilibrium if the government ever
deviates. Thus, if the rate of discount is not too high, the government can use debt to smooth
labor taxes across shocks to αt, as it would if it could commit to a conditional sequence of
taxes and debt payments. On the other hand, there also exist sunspot equilibria as well
where debt payments Rt depend on the realization of γt. Households will be willing to buy
the government paper as long as the average return for holding government paper causes the
appropriate intertemporal ﬁrst order condition to hold, and the government will be willing to
pay the high debt payments when called on to do so as long as this is preferred to reversion
12to the balanced budget equilibrium. Thus it is possible to construct equilibria in which a
crisis (the realization of a particular range of sunspot values) causes the price of government
paper to plummet. A key question is what diﬀerence the existence of multi-period debt has
on whether the smoothing equilibria or the sunspot equilbria exist. The next section argues
it makes no diﬀerence at all.
6. Constructing an Equivalence Between the Games
In this section the main theorems of the paper are stated and proved. Theorem 1
states that the outcome (in terms of real variables) of any equilibrium of the one-period debt
game can be replicated as the outcome of the many-period debt game. Theorem 2 states the
converse. Theorem 3 derives necessary and suﬃcient conditions on total gross ﬂows and real
variables (taxes, labor, and consumption), which determine whether there exists an incentive
compatible timing structure for debt auctions.
Theorem 1. If the number of subperiods of the many-period debt game J weakly exceeds
the number of subperiods for the one-period debt game I, for each equilibrium of the one-
period debt game, there is an equilibrium of the many-period debt game where path play for
consumption, labor, taxes, and government consumption is identical.
Proof. Let ˆ X, ˆ R, and ˆ τ denote the government’s path play; ˆ Pt denote path prices; and
ˆ Lt denote household path play in the one-period debt game. This strategy uniquely deﬁnes
a strategy in the many-period debt game as follows: on the path of play, the government in
period t sets Rs
t,i = 0 for all s<t− 1, R
t−1
t,i = ˆ Rt,i, Xt,i = ˆ Xt,i, and taxes the same. Next,
likewise set P s
t = 0 for all s<tand P t
t,i = ˆ Pt for all i ∈{ 0,...,J}. Finally, set Lt the same
(again on the path of play). By construction, this gives the same payoﬀ to the government as
13in the one-period game. Oﬀ path, let prices and actions correspond to the balanced budget
rule equilibrium, which is weakly worse than any oﬀ-path payoﬀs in the one-period game
equilibrium. Relative to the one-period debt game, the many-period debt game does give the
government an expanded variety of possible deviations from this strategy and thus potentially
higher one-shot deviation payoﬀs. (That is, when checking whether a deviation is proﬁtable,
one must now check to see if the government wishes to make R payments to holders of paper
older than t−1.) Since, in a symmetric equilibrium, such a deviation acts as an extra lump-
sum payment to households and in the one-period game the government moves last, the gain
from the deviation can be achieved in the one-period debt game.
Note that this result holds for all J ≥ I ≥ 1 and thus obviously for J = I =1 .I td o e s
not depend on the ability of the government to hold more than one debt auction per period.
The next result does.
Theorem 2. There exists an I<∞ (where I is the number of sub-periods in the one-
period debt game)such that for each equilibrium of the many-period debt game, there is an
equilibrium of the one-period debt game where path play for consumption, labor, taxes, and




















t=1 be the stochastic outcome path of an equilibrium of the many-
period game. Use these to construct an equilibrium of the one-period game. First, deﬁne
play after a deviation by the government to be the balanced budget strategy. Next, construct
path play from every history of shocks θ
t. For taxes, simply have the government set ˆ τt (the
taxes it imposes in the one-period debt game) equal to the level it imposes in the many-period
14debt game. Next, let the price of period t paper (which must be the same at all subperiods









This is the total price in period t (in the many-period debt game) of all the old and new









(or total lump-sum payments in the one-period debt game equal total lump-sum payments



















or total bond payments in period t in the one-period debt game equal the period t value of
all old paper in the many-period debt equilibrium plus the total bond payments in period t
from the government to households.
Without specifying the timing of auctions and repayments, constructing prices and
total repayments in this manner is suﬃcient for ensuring that household incentives are un-
changed, and thus the requirement in the one-period debt game that households are optimiz-
ing is satisﬁed. The argument is as follows: Since taxes and lump-sum transfers (in total) are
unchanged, the consumer’s budget set is unchanged. (Gross transfers are changed since the
current value of old paper is added to both the transfer from households to government and
15the transfers from government to households). Next, since taxes are the same, the current
period tradeoﬀ between consumption and labor is unchanged. This leaves the intertemporal
incentives. Since consumer optimization is satisﬁed in the many-period debt equilibrium, for
































The intertemporal condition for household optimization in the one-period debt game
is
u





This is then implied by the constructed values for ˆ Pt and
 I
i=1 ˆ Rt+1,i.
Like household incentives, government incentives when setting taxes are also unaﬀected
by the timing of auctions and repayments. By construction, following path play yields the
same payoﬀ to the government in both games and a weakly lower deviation payoﬀ in the
one-period debt game, since no continuation equilibrium can yield a worse payoﬀ than the
balanced budget strategy. Since path play at this point in the game (choosing taxes) is weakly
optimal in the many-period debt game, it is weakly optimal in the one-period debt game.
16To check government incentives when making payments, one needs to specify the







t) as the smallest integer weakly greater than ˆ Pt(θ
t)/Zt(θ
t). Since Zt is bounded
below by G and Pt is bounded above by P, Nt has a uniform upper bound. Next, set
ˆ qt,1(θ












t), and set ˆ Xt,i(θ
t) and ˆ Rt,i(θ
t)
as follows. After tax revenues are collected, use these revenues to pay oﬀ as much of the
“obligations” ˆ Xt(θ
t) and ˆ Rt(θ
t) as possible, but without exceeding these totals. (The division
is irrelevant). Then, after each debt auction i ≥ 2, continue to use the totality of these auction
revenues to make these payments until the totals are correct.
To see that the government will not wish to deviate, let Yt,i(θ
t) denote the amount of















Since after a debt auction τt(θ














This is monotonic in Yt,i. Any period t allocation which can be achieved given a deviation
with Y1 on hand can be achieved at Y2 ≥ Y1. (The government always has the ability to set
17government spending lower than Yt,i by making a lump-sum payment.)
Finally, the government can be trusted not to deviate when it has on hand Zt(θ
t) since,
under the multiperiod debt equilibrium, the government must have on hand at some point the




For the preceding theorem to hold, the number of subperiods I in the game with
one-period debt may need to be higher than the corresponding number of subperiods with
many-period debt, J. For instance, if J = 1 in the many-period debt game (or there is only
one debt auction and one repayment in each period), it is not the case that this can always
be replicated with one-period debt without having multiple debt auctions in each period. In
a given period, one needs as many subperiods as the total debt divided by the maximum
of per-period government spending and tax revenues. If the time period is taken to be a
quarter, for the United States in 2000, this number is roughly thirteen—the number of weeks
in a quarter. For reasonable speciﬁcations of the level of government debt and the length of
the period, the number of required subperiods is not unity, but it also is not high.
The intuition behind Theorem 2 is straightfoward. Suppose an equilibrium of the
many-period debt game has, in a given period, a high value of total government debt. If
this debt is all long-term (say console debt), then at no time does the government need to
have a large gross ﬂow from the household sector to the government during an auction. For
instance, if a high α is realized, the government needs only to have an inﬂow suﬃcient to
cover the current primary deﬁcit (Gt − τtLt) plus interest payments on past debt. On the
other hand, if I = 1 and all debt must be one-period debt, then the government needs to
raise at the single auction enough to cover the current primary deﬁcit and the entire value of
18the old debt. If after this inﬂow it defaults it gets a higher current beneﬁt since defaulting on
the entire debt after collecting enough to pay it oﬀ is a higher surprise lump sum tax than
defaulting after collecting a lower amount. The key to Theorem 2 is to show that by breaking
the auctions into a ﬁnite and uniformly bounded number of smaller auctions, this eﬀect of
one period debt is eliminated.
Theorems 1 and 2 create a simpliﬁcation regarding the computation of equilibria.
Speciﬁcally, one can simply assume the existence of one type of paper at the beginning of a
period. The next theorem goes further and shows that, in some sense, one does not need to
consider the timing of transfers between the government and households, but instead consider
only the totals (over the period) {Pt(θ
t),X t(θ
t),R t(θ
t)}. In particular, it shows there is a way
to construct the timing of these transfers such that the government never wishes to deviate
if and only if two inequalities hold in each period. These inequalities ensure (1) that the
government does not to wish to deviate when setting taxes and (2) that the government does
not wish to deviate if, after taxes and labor are determined, it has on hand the maximum of
path tax revenues and path government spending.








 (Ct)Pt = βEθt+1[u
 (Ct+1)Rt+1|αt]
for all t ≥ 1 and histories θ
t.F o rI = P/G, this sequence corresponds to the outcome path









s−t(u(Cs) − w(Ls)+v(Lt − Ct)) ≥ (15)
max













Proof. Suppose conditions (14) and (15) are satisﬁed. That (14) is satisﬁed implies the
government will not wish to deviate when setting taxes. That (15) is satisﬁed implies that
for a given t and θ
t, the government can be trusted not to deviate if the amount of the
consumption good it has on hand at any point in the period does not exceed the maximum
of tax revenues and government spending Zt(θ
t). As in the proof to Theorem 2, one can use
a sequence of auctions and repayments (of uniformly bounded length) to keep the amount of
the consumption good the government has on hand weakly below this amount.
Next suppose (14) is violated. It is immediate that no structure of auctions and
repayments can keep the government from deviating when setting taxes. Finally, suppose
(15) is violated. Since the government must have on hand at least Zt(θt) at some point
regardless of the timing of auctions and repayments, it will always ﬁnd it optimal to deviate
at that point.
207. Conclusion
As stated in the introduction, large debt rollovers have been suggested as a potential
culprit in several recent ﬁnancial crises. This paper presents a plausible economic environment
where this is impossible. It is important to be careful here, however. Nothing in this paper
implies that the crises themselves should not have happened. The games presented here, with
and without long-term debt, allow a large variety of equilibria, including sunspot equilibria
which can be interpreted as allowing crises. What this paper shows is that such equilibria
exist with and without long-term debt.
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